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Abstract—Alphanumeric authentication routinely fails to reg-
ulate access to resources with the required stringency, primarily
due to usability issues. Initial deployment did not reveal the
problems of passwords; deep and profound flaws only emerged
once passwords were deployed in the wild. The need for a
replacement is widely acknowledged yet despite over a decade
of research into knowledge-based alternatives, few, if any, have
been adopted by industry.
Alternatives are unconvincing for three primary reasons.
The first is that alternatives are rarely investigated beyond the
initial proposal, with only the results from a constrained lab test
provided to convince adopters of their viability. The second is that
alternatives are seldom tested realistically where the authenticator
mediates access to something of value. The third is that the testing
rarely varies the device or context beyond that initially targeted.
In the modern world different devices are used across a variety
of contexts. What works well in one context may easily fail in
another.
Consequently, the contribution of this paper is an “in the
wild” evaluation of an alternative authentication mechanism that
had demonstrated promise in its lab evaluation. In the field test
the mechanism was deployed to actual users to regulate access
to an application in a context beyond that initially proposed.
The performance of the mechanism is reported and discussed.
We conclude by reflecting on the value of field evaluations of
alternative authentication mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passwords are not only powerful in theory, but are the most
popular form of authentication in practice [1]. The dominance
of passwords is unsurprising, given the numerous advantages
of the approach [2]. The concept is inexpensive to implement,
trivial to learn and works across countless devices [3]. Nev-
ertheless, despite such strengths, passwords are plagued with
usability problems that ensure they are increasingly not fit-
for-purpose [4], [5], [6]. This reality is particularly perplexing
given extensive research into knowledge-based alternatives [7].
Dunphy et al. [8] argue that the scarcity of deployment ev-
idence and real-world use are prominent explanations for poor
adoption of alternatives by industry. Similarly, the emerging
trend in alternative authentication research is to propose novel
mechanisms but not to conduct extensive exploration and field
investigations of actual use [9]. Furthermore, Beautement and
Sasse suggest that not only is real-world performance rarely
investigated, but data reported from controlled laboratory stud-
ies is unlikely to be representative of actual performance [10].
Moreover, investigations rarely consider actual authentication
context, target specific task scenarios or even reflect emerging
consumer and industry trends [11]. The reality is that individ-
uals may perform the same task, but not necessarily on the
same device. An individual may authenticate on a traditional
desktop computer during a task on one occasion, but on another
occasion they perform the same task and authentication step
on a different device, such as a smartphone.
Therefore, any alternative authentication scheme also en-
counters the challenge of scaling between devices. Passwords
have demonstrated an ability to scale between traditional
computers, such as desktops and laptops, and more mobile
devices, such as smartphones and tablets. This suggests that
any alternative authentication solution seeking adoption would
either need to demonstrate convincing performance in switch-
ing between devices or, at least, outline how solutions would
perform when authentication occurs on a non-target device.
Fig. 1. The previously proposed alternative authentication mechanism, Tetrad.
The mechanism was initially designed and targeted for display in a shared-
space [12], e.g. television in a living room.
Consequently, the aim of this paper is to disseminate
experience of a field investigation of a previously proposed
alternative mechanism, in a context outside that originally
proposed [12]. This means that authentication was tested
realistically. It mediated access to something the user cared
about: “in the wild”.
The contributions of this paper are:
• we report on a field investigation of a previously
proposed alternative authentication mechanism that
performed well it its initial lab-based evaluation;
• we highlight aspects related to the design and method-
ological considerations that need to be contemplated
in carrying out a field investigation of an alternative
authentication mechanism;
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• we discuss the lessons we learned and reflect on
the value of probationing an alternative authentication
mechanism in the wild.
The expectation is that researchers can build on these lessons
to guide their future research and subsequently improve knowl-
edge transfer and adoption of promising alternatives by indus-
try.
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE
A. Alternative Authentication
Researchers have proposed many alternative authentication
mechanisms, as reviewed by Biddle et al. [1]. Blonder made
the first notable proposal [13], it required individuals to
remember positions within an image. PassPoints, proposed
by [14], is built along the same lines as Blonder’s patent.
Passpoints was evaluated by 40 evaluators but not as part of a
realistic workflow.
Draw-a-secret or DAS, proposed by [15], is a recall-based
graphical authentication mechanism requiring an individual to
draw an authentication secret to access an application.
Another variation of alternative mechanisms is those that
require users to identify “their” secret images from one or
more challenge sets. PassFaces is one of the few commercial
mechanisms of this kind. The authentication approach assigns
an individual a collection of faces as their authentication secret.
One using abstract images was proposed by [16], called De´ja`
Vu. Others have used handwritten numerals [17], Mikons [18]
and cultural images [19].
Graphical authentication mechanisms are highly suscepti-
ble to onlooker observation. The majority of designers im-
plicitly assume that all interaction with their mechanisms
occurs in solitude. The beauty of alphanumeric authentication
is that it relies on specific hardware that can, for the most
part, be wielded privately. However, this does not mean that
alphanumeric authentication, as a process, is somehow superior
in terms of resisting observation. A number of mechanisms
have attempted to resist observation [20], [21], [22], [12]. We
will be trialling one of these in our field test.
B. Field Testing
No one would dream of releasing a product without carry-
ing out tests with end users. The testing of user interfaces is
often carried out in a lab-based situation using well established
techniques from the field of psychology. Yet Thomas and
Kellogg [23] argue that such studies are severely limited due to
omissions of real-life factors and additions of other factors due
to the tightly controlled evaluation environment. They explain
that the evaluation is not ecologically sound.
A field test is essentially a half-way house between a
strictly controlled evaluation and a launch to widespread use
in a variety of contexts, by a diverse user base. One tests the
mechanism outside a controlled environment “in the wild”,
relinquishing control to see how it will perform once it emerges
from a protected environment.
It has been argued that field testing, is essential, that one
cannot stop at a successful lab test and trumpet successful
results if performance is promising [2], [10]. The need for field
testing is a strong requirement, and does not necessarily enjoy
widespread agreement. Kjeldskov et al. [24], for example,
argue that field studies of mobile interfaces, is not worth
the time, expense or hassle. Similarly, Kaikkonen et al. [25]
found that studies delivered little benefit based on the time and
expense of field trial.
Yet, Nielson et al. [26] declare field testing worthwhile.
They found that issues such as cognitive load and interaction
style were only discovered during the field study of a mobile
interface. Furthermore, Rogers et al. [27] argue that lessons
learned in field tests are essential in refining applications and
improving the user experience. Bannon [28] argues for field
investigations as follows: “What is needed are both ‘quick
and dirty’ methods that can give rapid feedback ... as well
as more extensive field evaluations ... before, during and after
the adoption of new technologies” (p.233).
C. Field Testing of Alternative Authentication
The unfortunate reality is that despite a decade and a half
of research into graphical authentication mechanisms industry
has not embraced them. There may be many reasons but one
of the most obvious is that industry is not convinced that
something hatched in a hot house will be able to perform its
function when subjected to the strains of widespread use by a
heterogeneous user base.
Most well-known alternative authentication mechanisms
have undergone only small-scale or lab-based evaluations, eg.
[29], [16], [30]. Some notable exceptions are worth mention-
ing. Brostoff & Sasse performed a field-study of Passfaces
[11], one of few commercially available mechanisms [31].
In terms of context, participants were students, using the
mechanism as part of a Web application for coursework. They
measured how long authentication took and found that it took
a lot longer than password authentication and this caused their
participants to use the system less often. Davis et al. [32]
uncovered some problems with respect to predictability of
choice of faces, mirroring the predictability issues of pass-
words themselves.
Chiasson et al. [33] also performed a field-study. The
alternative that was trialled was PassPoints, a cued-recall
approach devised by Wiedenbeck et al. [34], [14]. The study
also used Computing Science undergraduates to evaluate the
mechanism. The initial work unearthed efficiency concerns,
with times required to enter the secret being much longer
than password entry times. Chiasson et al. reported that
authentication improved with practice and that students were
incredibly accurate: 78% of attempts were within 4 pixels or
1.5mm. Many in industry would nou doubt consider a 78%
success rate to be unacceptable. In the study by Shay et al.
[35] more than half of their participants dropped out during
their evaluation. No real-life service can risk annoying their
customers this much.
III. AUTHENTICATION IN THE WILD
The aim of assessing an experimental authentication mech-
anism in the wild is to gather evidence of performance and
acceptance by individuals. Such an assessment acknowledges
the reality that while an experimental security solution may
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perform well in a controlled setting, it may perform dramati-
cally differently in the wild [36]. Performance in a particular
environment is not necessarily indicative of performance in
another [37]. The motivation for assessment in the wild is that
any evidence gathered during “in the wild” deployment will
be indicative of realistic performance. Nevertheless, various
aspects of evaluation in the wild need to be given due con-
sideration in order to ensure that the evaluation is not only
fruitful but representative of real-world performance.
The first aspect to consider is the ecological validity of the
evaluation. An authentication mechanism is typically deployed
in the wild, as a preliminary to the actual task of interest. The
task is of primary importance; authentication is a secondary
goal: another step among many [10]. Consequently, authenti-
cation in the wild can be only realistically be considered as part
and parcel of a package; broadly comprising an authentication
mechanism and associated application.
The authentication mechanism must sit comfortably within
such a package. The authentication mechanism and application
should represent a balance in terms of security needs [38].
It seems senseless, for example, to embed military-grade
authentication within a consumer-focused task. An unrealis-
tic coupling is likely to lead consumers to either abandon
the application or resort to undesirable coping mechanisms.
Matching the strength of the mechanism to the value of the
protected asset is an important consideration not only during
deployment, but in a strong ecologically valid evaluation as
well.
The persuasiveness of the primary task is another important
aspect to consider in terms of field evaluation. The reality is
that many assessments of authentication mechanisms rely on
perverse incentives or unrealistic incentives, e.g. course credit.
These incentives could potentially influence frequency of use
and mask the acceptance of an authentication mechanism. If
we avoid incentives we have to ensure that the primary task
is persuasive enough to motivate consumers to return to the
application by offering actual benefits [39]. The barrier to
their receiving such benefits is the experimental authentication
mechanism. A costly complex solution would arguably lead to
a decrease in authentication attempts over time.
An authentication mechanism must have a clear purpose,
and this purpose should be transparent to the user. This is an
important aspect to consider as users should be empowered
with a clear understanding of the consequences of authentica-
tion [40]. The presentation of the authentication mechanism
should be consistent and transparent to ensure users are
aware of the outcome of authenticating. The concern is that
inconsistent and thoughtless presentation of the authentica-
tion mechanism may confuse users, influencing their decision
to authenticate, or not. Moreover, thoughtless and repeated
authentication could be exploited by attackers since users
may become desensitised and simply authenticate without
questioning the consequences of authenticating.
In summary, there are at least three important aspects
to address when evaluating an experimental authentication
mechanism in wild, they are:
• Ecologically-valid application
An authentication mechanism is coupled with a realis-
tic primary task [36], e.g. military-grade authentication
solution is evaluated as part of a military-grade task.
• Persuasive primary task
The application should offer benefits and avoid per-
verse incentives that could influence behaviour [39],
i.e. course credit and monetary rewards are significant
benefits, potentially worth the cost of complex authen-
tication.
• Clear consequence of authentication
The authentication mechanism should be thoughtfully
presented to ensure the user has a clear perception of
the outcome of authentication [40].
Nevertheless, while the aforementioned aspects are important
to the exploration of experimental authentication mechanisms
in the wild, there are also other pertinent issues that need to be
considered. Researchers have a responsibility for individuals
involved in any investigation. Consequently, application use
must not harm [41], as it is unacceptable for any investigation
to impact on users in a negative way. In the context of evaluat-
ing an authentication mechanism, an advisable direction is to
use a ‘low risk’ application, that collects minimal information
for the purposes of evaluation [42].
There is also the responsibility of managing the transition
and/or sustainability of the application [43]. If the application
does deliver tangible benefits and participants come to depend
upon it, researchers should support a careful transition. In some
senses this is important in order to sustain future research
and investigation but there are also ethical implications. If,
for example, students come to depend on an application
during their studies, withdrawing it or failing to patch it could
negatively impact on their performance i.e. inadvertently cause
harm.
Consequently, in application deployment the follow areas
need to be given due consideration as well:
• Ethical responsibility for participants
The desire to evaluate an alternative authentication
mechanism in a realistic setting must not override the
safety or well-being of the user [41].
• Ecological responsibility for participants
The application should exist beyond the evaluation
period, as participants could come to depend on the
application or the ecology supporting it [43].
These ethical and ecological aspects along with the afore-
mentioned aspects pertinent to authentication research were
considered and influence the design of our investigation.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. Participants
The participants were enrolled undergraduate students at
the School of Psychology, University of Glasgow. The demo-
graphic was diverse but only students owning an Apple iPhone
and valid iTunes Store account could download and execute
the application.
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B. Apparatus & Measurements
A bespoke iOS application was developed and designed
for participants to download, listen and annotate lecture record-
ings. An arguably persuaisive primary task for student enrolled
in a course. The use of the authentication was clear and
consistent: access to the application was meditated with Tetrad,
participants authenticated to access it. The application could be
downloaded, installed and executed on any device with iOS 4.0
or later. The application was not designed for Apple iPad but
could execute on the device, if operating system requirements
were met. The package was considered an ecologically valid
application of Tetrad, as the mechanism was envisioned as part
of a digital content purchasing process.
A registration code was requested from participants when
the application was first launched. The application was not
usable without a registration code, issued in conjunction with
the School of Psychology. Registration codes could only be
used once and if an individual had to re-register, they had to
request an additional registration code. The registration process
did not collect any personal information from participants.
The registration code was purely for the creation of a Tetrad
authentication secret.
The alternative authentication mechanism was bootstrapped
with an image-set of staff photographs provided by the School
of Psychology. An image-set of Hollywood celebrities was
initially favoured due to their perceived familiarity with par-
ticipants, but complicated due to legal and technical con-
cerns. Consequently, the image-set of staff photographs was
considered a close approximation as staff are ’community
celebrities’, i.e. familiar among students. Furthermore, legal
and technical issues could be addressed as permission could
be sought directly from staff and the School itself.
Metrics pertaining to performance were recorded and col-
lected for registration and authentication processes. The key
metrics include the time spent on registration and authentica-
tion as well as the success and alignment of each authentication
attempt.
These metrics were logged to assess the alternative au-
thentication mechanism. The application was considered low-
risk, as minimal information was collected and only lecture
content was primarly at risk. In order to cater to enrolled
students who did not own an iOS device, had no interest
in the application or had become frustrated with it, a web
application that offered similar functionality was deployed.
The web application was managed independently and relied
on alphanumeric authentication.
Finally, the School of Psychology was informed the al-
ternative authentication mechanism may fail or exhibit errors.
The client was content to proceed as only the lecture recordings
were at risk, not participants. The proviso was if the application
exhibited such errors, it was to be removed from distribution
until such as errors were addressed. Lastly, a sustainability
agreement was reached that the School of Psychology was
allowed use of the application beyond the investigation.
C. Procedure
The School of Psychology informed all enrolled students,
by email, that an application for iOS devices would be made
available during the first term. The communication requested
all students to complete a survey that probed the popularity
of Internet-connected devices. There was no requirement to
participate in the survey, although only those students who
had completed the survey and indicated they owned an iOS
device would be automatically contacted with a registration
code. The application was distribution via the Apple App Store
(iOS) and there was no requirement or expectation to use the
application. Individuals preferring not to use the application or
without an iOS device were advised of the web application.
Lastly, participants were advised they could consult a website
for documentation, email for technical support and were en-
couraged to provide feedback via email or iTunes Store review
mechanism.
V. RESULTS
A. Registration
There were total of 63 registration records, 28 active and 35
inactive, generated by 45 distinct devices. The 63 registration
records can be decomposed into three separate groups, in terms
of how many times a device was used to register. The device
identifier is recorded during the registration stage. The first
group is for devices that were used once and comprises 29
registrations records, with 16 active. The second group is for
devices that were used twice and comprises 28 registration
records, with 14 active. The third group is for devices that
were used three times and comprises of 6 registration records,
with 1 active. This means 46% of registration records come
from devices used to register once. There is also not a diverse
selection in images, with users making similar image choices,
see Table I.
The average time to complete the registration stage was
312s, with a minimum time of 25.17s and maximum time
of 5041.94s. If we consider only active records, average
registration time increases to 360.73s while the minimum
and maximum time remain the same. If we consider only
non-active records, average time decreases to 273.01s with a
minimum time of 41.78s and maximum time of 2738.42s.
B. Authentication
There are total of 387 attempts, 226 were successful, 161
unsuccessful. The 226 successful attempts can be decomposed
into 180 horizontal attempts and 46 vertical image alignments.
The average time for all attempts was 1094.75s, with
an average time of 671.68s for all successful attempts and
1688.64s for unsuccessful attempts. The average time for all
horizontal attempts was 678.09s and for all vertical attempts
was 646.58s.
Title P1 P2 P3 P4 Count
Senior University Teacher 12 6 6 11 35
Teaching Assistant 10 10 4 8 32
Professor 9 4 7 8 28
Reader 7 10 7 4 28
University Teacher 5 6 6 5 22
TABLE I. MOST POPULAR SELECTIONS
The minimum time of 1.43s seems small. If we consider all
attempts less than 25s, the average time of an attempt is 13.40s
with a minimum time of 1.43s and maximum time of 24.50s.
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Fig. 2. Attempts made by Top 8 Devices
The average time for a successful attempt is 16.84s with a
minimum time of 4.81s and maximum time of 24.21s, leaving
47 records. The average time for an unsuccessful attempt is
11.86s with a minimum time of 1.43s and maximum time of
24.50s, leaving 101 records.
There are 52 attempts taking less than 10 seconds, with
an average time of 6.81s. There are 7 successful attempts,
all horizontal, with an average time of 8.02s. There are 45
unsuccessful attempts with average time of 6.62s, with a
minimum of 1.43s and maximum of 9.86s. This means that
68.2% of attempts took less than 25 seconds and 86.5% of
attempts less than 10 seconds are unsuccessful.
VI. DISCUSSION
The evaluation of a graphical authentication mechanism
with non-technical students is relatively unusual as most mech-
anisms are deployed to technical students, enrolled in science
and engineering courses [11], [33], [44]. Furthermore, target-
ing the mechanism at smartphone users was fertile ground
as the application was installed on a respectable number of
devices, 45 out of a possible 90.
It seemed to make sense to trial Tetrad’s new Smartphone
implementation, since it had performed well in lab-based
evaluations. Based on its probation we have to conclude that
Tetrad is not a viable mechanism. A number of problems
emerged during the field trial.
A. Effectiveness
The application was downloaded, installed and used by
many students, much like any other mobile application. Usage
logs revealed that the community mainly used the application
during pre-exam revision. On reflection, the application was
mediocre for the community it served. This is a valuable lesson
as proper consideration of community activity would have
not only made for a better application, benefiting students,
but would have generated more usage information to support
meaningful analysis and a more realistic probation of Tetrad.
The mechanism did not demonstrate strength either. Users
created predictable passwords by picking the same images,
arguably due to the familiarity of some of the images used
within the mechanism. This is addressable, if a suitable image
set can be identified, but this problem is experienced by most
recognition-based graphical authentication mechanisms, and is
not specific to Tetrad.
The decision to use staff images was to: (a) harness the
desirable aspects of faces by using community celebrities while
avoiding undesirable aspects such as those reported by Davis et
al. [32]; and (b) improve communication of the core intent of
the mechanism; students would know when this mechanism
was presented that they would be authenticating for a task
associated with Psychology.
Unfortunately, the use of staff images did not curb the
human tendency to create predictable passwords. 58% of image
selections were represented by just five images, or rather, five
members of staff. These members of staff were all central
to teaching within the department, specifically in the early
years. Therefore, it seems users were not making assessments
necessarily based on attraction but on familiarity.
This finding serves only to confirm the biggest issue of
recognition-based graphical authentication approaches: ‘boot-
strapping’ a mechanism with images is challenging [8]. This
concern is not just restricted to image type but to image
distribution and delivery, as well. The high-resolution dis-
plays now present on most ‘post-PC’ devices demand high-
resolution images, resulting in larger file sizes. These images
can be distributed inside the application but this restricts
authentication options and increases the size of the application.
Knowing the connection type and data transfer speeds
would be valuable in designing future mechanisms. In ret-
rospect, the ‘semi-wild’ environment used in our probation
would have been perfect for extracting such information.
Therefore, we advise researchers assessing a mechanism in
a similar fashion to log such information.
B. Satisfaction
The criticism directed at the authentication mechanism
took two forms. The first was that some students felt the
authentication mechanism was unnecessary. They felt that
an application that delivered lecture recordings to an indi-
viduals mobile device should be free from the shackles of
authentication. Consequently, some users of the application felt
that the authentication mechanism was an unrealistic addition.
However, such an argument can be contrasted with the re-
quirements laid out by the client. The School of Psychology
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was adamant that the application access be mediated via an
authentication mechanism, during and after the evaluation
period. This confirms the difficulty of fixing on a realistic use
of an authentication mechanism. The second form of criticism
was that the authentication mechanism was unusable. There
were some anecdotal comments that suggested the graphical
authentication was not well received.
Figure 3 shows a review from the iTunes Store that a
student posted after they had downloaded and used the applica-
tion. It encapsulates both forms of criticism. The comments are
visceral and emphasise that the authentication mechanism es-
sentially drove the reviewer away. The authentication approach
was novel to the user and this novelty has many connotations,
not all positive. The review provides some insight into these
negative connotations. The reviewer is arguably distrusting of
the authentication mechanism and not convinced that they
entered the authentication secret incorrectly or whether the
authentication mechanism itself processed it incorrectly. Alter-
natively, the comment does make a valid user interface remark
that the user is unable to make corrections as they are not sure
what they have entered. The final remark is that the reviewer
is resolved not use the application until the authentication
mechanism is removed. The remark makes the point that he/she
was not going to waste time dealing with an experimental
authentication mechanism, as something untested would not
be used to protect something valuable.
The user base was intelligent and arguably did not appre-
ciate being used as guinea pigs to evaluate an authentication
mechanism to access valuable learning resources. However, in
fairness, students were not forced to use the application and
could use a password-protected portal to access lecture record-
ings. The authentication mechanism clearly alienated some
students. The reality is that several users (23%) abandoned the
application after authentication and did not return. Therefore,
it many respects the alternative authentication mechanism was
a failure from the outset. It frustrated too many, and drove too
many users away.
C. Efficiency
Users spent an excessive amount of time entering secrets,
on average 1094.75s. This can be improved by removing
outliers, resulting in 36.66s, or 45.02s, if only considering
successful attempts. Some shorter successful attempts were
made, with the fastest being 4.85s. Unfortunately, users did not
seem to improve with successive use. Figure 2 illustrates this,
initial oscillation is likely from users becoming familiar with
the mechanism. However, even after many attempts oscillation
still persists, although it is tempered. This is likely the result
of the mechanism being a searchmetric [45] and requiring
individuals to reposition images once they have recognised
them. The reality is that this combination is not best suited
to a mobile device, 45.02s is not unforgivably long for an au-
thentication mechanism but is clearly far more time-consuming
than password entry.
D. Interface Inconsistency
Nearly two thirds of unsuccessful attempts took less than
25 seconds, with most of them taking less than 10s. This
unacceptably low success rate suggested a major flaw in the
implementation. 41.6% of attempts with the mechanism were
unsuccessful and 226 successful.
Upon examination we realised that the problems started at
registration. Registration is when a user is first exposed to an
authentication mechanism, making it more than just a sign-up
phase, it constitutes a learning phase. The interaction a user has
with the mechanism during registration is carried with them
into authentication. That we failed to understand or appreciate
this nuance is our biggest error. Passwords display particular
consistency here: type to register, type to authenticate. Our
mechanism did not display this consistency.
The numerous, short, failed authentication attempts rep-
resented interaction errors rather than memorability errors.
During registration, users were required to choose four “secret”
images. They did this by double-tapping on the images they
wanted. At authentication, they were required by the mecha-
nism to reposition images by swiping left, right, up or down.
When images were lined up satisfactorily, they did a double-
tap to submit their attempt. There were instructions to this
effect.
In our minds the intention was clear: double-tap to sub-
mit a choice. During registration, submit your secret image
choice, and at authentication submit your image alignment.
Unfortunately, what was communicated was: when you see an
image, double tap it. We told them, in the instructions, about
swiping, but their prior experience was more compelling than
the displayed instructions and overrode them.
Unfortunately, what happened was that the registration
experience habituated them into double tapping on their image
of choice. When authenticating, it was natural instinct to see
their image and double tap it. This submitted an authentication
attempt, which obviously failed since they had not yet aligned
their images. It seems that they were unaware of their error,
and continued to try to authenticate in the same way, with
growing frustration. This could have been the reason behind
multiple registrations by the same person. Furthermore, we
should not assume that individuals have the same familiarity
with novel interaction mechanisms and objects, as they do, say,
with keyboards and characters [46].
VII. REFLECTION
We detailed Tetrad’s deficiencies in the previous section as
well as the difficulties we faced because of the nature of the
evaluation. The question is: “were these revealed because of
the field test, or could they have been detected by a lab study?”
Setting up the field test was a huge task that we conducted
in good faith, believing it to be superior for testing Tetrad’s
smartphone implementation rather than a further lab study. In
terms of cost-benefit, was it worthwhile?
Consider each of the deficiencies that emerged during the
field trial: Effectiveness, Efficiency, Satisfaction and Interface
Inconsistency. The predictability of image choice is a well-
known problem for graphical authentication mechanisms. We
could undeniably have trialled our image choice in a lab
study. The inconsistency of the interface, too, would have been
revealed during a simple usability evaluation. The inconve-
nience of authentication could also easily have been measured.
The usefulness of the application has nothing to do with
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Fig. 3. iTunes Store review submitted by a participant.
the authentication mechanism and this deficiency is a direct
consequence of the decision to carry out a field test while
wanting to ensure that evaluators were not put at risk. This
meant we couldn’t feasibly protect anything of real value with
Tetrad, and this constraint meant the application was probably
not worth the effort of authenticating.
So, in effect, we gave our participants an Application
that did not meet their needs, and made them use a very
inconvenient mechanism to access it. Moreover, the authen-
tication mechanism did not offer a high degree of security
since the image choice was predictable. This did not constitute
a particular issue since what was being protected (lecture
recordings) were freely available from the school’s website.
Here was a further issue: we put a hurdle in the way of
their accessing something they could access very easily using
another channel. We can only conclude that we ought not to
have carried out this field test.
If we ignore the flawed nature of the application for the
moment, let us focus on the purpose of our field test: evaluating
the mechanism itself. It could be that our Tetrad smartphone
implementation was too poor to justify probationing it. The
initial lab evaluation did not reveal the problems we experi-
enced during the lab study, probably due to the fact that in the
lab study authentication was the main task and not an obstacle
to be hurdled to access an application. Moreover, the initial
application was implemented for a large screen and it was
perhaps the novelty of the mechanism that attributed to the
positive responses. It could have been that the mechanism was
simply unsuitable for use on a smartphone.
We initially attributed the failure during the field test to
these facts. We then started to wonder whether field testing is
indeed the silver bullet it is accepted to be within this field. It
is only worth carrying out if it delivers insights commensurate
with the huge expense that goes into launching and sustaining
it. Since we could have gained insights into the deficiencies
of our mechanism in lab studies it clearly did not justify the
expense in this case.
Are field tests still wise? They do seem to be the gold
standard of evaluations. However, we strongly urge that mul-
tiple lab evaluations be carried out before a field trial is
contemplated so that others do not go to huge expense, as
we did, and have very little to show for it once the test has
concluded. What we concluded at the end of this process was
that we rushed into the field test prematurely.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It would have been nice to have been able to report that
Tetrad fulfilled its original promise during probation. It would
have been a most satisfactory conclusion. Research, however,
often delivers unexpected results, and this has certainly been
the case here. Even so, we are reporting our results so that
other researchers will be warned about auditioning their own
mechanisms prematurely: so that others may avoid the errors
we made.
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